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Abstract
In this paper [Chin. Phys. B 27 (2018) 080304], Du and Bao proposed a quantum secret sharing
protocol based on two-particle transform of Bell states. We study the security of the proposed
protocol and find that it is not secure, that is, the two dishonest agents, Bob and Zach, can
collude to obtain Alice’s secret messages without the help of the other agents. Finally, we give a
possible improvement of the proposed protocol.
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1. Introduction
The cryptography is playing a significant role in the information society, and can be classified into the
classical cryptography and the quantum cryptography. The main difference between the two cryptography
focuses on the protection of security. The security of classical cryptography depends on the computa-
tional complexity. However, this kind of computational complexity might be broken by the strong power of
advanced algorithms. The security of quantum cryptography depends on the principles of quantum mechan-
ics, and can guarantee the unconditional security not only theoretically but also in a actual implementation.
Thus far, many branches of quantum cryptography have been presented to offer various security properties,
including quantum key distribution (QKD)[1-9], quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)[10-26],
quantum secret sharing (QSS) [27-53], and so on. In the following, let us introduce the three listed branches
2one by one. QKD, which is the earliest and maturest branch, is a process in which two communication
parties first generate a shared secret key by quantum states, and then apply this key to encrypt and decrypt
the secret messages. Since Bennett and Brassard [1] introduced the first QKD protocol with nonorthogonal
single polarization states, all kinds of QKD protocols were put forward. For example, Deng and Long [2]
proposed a two-step QKD protocol using practical faint laser pulses. Boyer et al. [3] proposed a QKD
scheme in which one participant owns the quantum device and the other doesn’t. Li et al. [4] proposed
two QKD protocols over two different collective-noise channels. Gao [5] proposed a QKD protocol by
swapping the entanglement of χ-type states. Lo et al. [7] proposed a measurement-device-independent
QKD protocol, and so on. Different from QKD, QSDC is to directly transmit secret messages without first
generating a key to encrypt them. In 2002, Long and Liu [10] proposed the first QSDC protocol using the
concept of quantum data block. In 2004, Deng and Long [11] proposed a QSDC protocol using only a
sequence of single photons. In 2005, Wang et al. [12] proposed a QSDC protocol with quantum superdense
coding in high-dimension Hilbert space. In 2007, Li et al. [15] proposed a QSDC protocol with quantum
encryption by using pure entanglement states. In 2013, Ren et al. [22] proposed a robust QSDC proto-
col with the spatial-mode entanglement of two-photon systems, and so on. In general, there exist only two
communication parties in QKD and QSDC. However, there are at least three communication parties in QSS.
In 1999, Hillery, Buzeˇk and Berthiaume [27] used three-particle GHZ state and four-particle GHZ state to
propose the first QSS protocol. In 2003, Bagherinezhad and Karimipour [28] utilized reusable GHZ states
as secure carriers to propose a QSS protocol. In 2006, Deng et al. [32] proposed a circular QSS protocol in
which the quantum information carrier, single photons or entangled particles, can circularly run. In 2008,
Markham et al. [36] gave a unified approach to secret sharing of both quantum and classical secrets using
graph states. In 2012, Jia et al. [45] proposed two dynamic QSS protocols in which the change of the agent
group is allowable during the procedure of sharing information. In 2017, Wang et al. [51] proposed a secure
(k, n)-threshold QSS protocol based on local distinguishability of orthogonal multiqudit entangled states,
and so on.
Recently, Du and Bao [52] proposed a novel multiparty QSS protocol (hereafter called DB protocol).
It is interesting that the DB protocol uses the two-particle transform of Bell states and has the functions
of dynamic parameter update. However, it is somewhat a pity that there exists a security loophole in the
DB protocol. That is, the two dishonest agents, Bob and Zach, can collaborate to obtain Alice’s secret
messages without being detected.
2. Security loophole in the DB protocol
3In order to clearly show the security loophole, firstly, let us review the five-party case of the DB protocol
[52] as follows.
(1) Alice prepares k pairs of Bell states (i.e.,|ϕ1〉th, ..., |ϕk〉th), where each pair is randomly in {|φ±〉 =
(|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2, |ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2}. She takes out photons t and h of these Bell states to form
T-sequence and H-sequence, respectively. Then, the T-sequence is sent to Bob.
(2) After receiving the T-sequence, firstly, Bob checks whether it is composed of single photons. Then,
he performs the local unitary operation U(αi) = cosαi|0〉〈0| + cosαi|1〉〈1| − sinαi|1〉〈0| + sinαi|0〉〈1|
on photon ti. Here, i = 1, 2, ..., k and αi ∈ {0, 2pi3 , 4pi3 }. Lastly, Bob sends the T(1)-sequence, which is
transformed from the T-sequence, to Charlie.
(3) After Charlie receives the T(1)-sequence, what he does is the same as what Bob does. Then Charlie
sends the T(2)-sequence, which is transformed from the T(1)-sequence, to Green. What Green does is also
the same as what Bob does. Then he sends the T(3)-sequence, which is transformed from the T(2)-sequence,
to Zach. Zach also performs the local unitary operation U(αi) on photon ti of his receiving sequence and
remains the T(4)-sequence which is transformed from the T(3)-sequence.
(4) Alice performs the four Pauli operations (σ00 = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|, σ01 = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|, σ10 =
|0〉〈0|− |1〉〈1|, σ11 = |0〉〈1|− |1〉〈0|) on photons of the H-sequence to encode her secret M. Then she sends
the H(1)-sequence, which is transformed from the H-sequence, to Zach.
(5) After Zach receives the H(1)-sequence, all the agents and Alice start to check eavesdropping. First,
Alice randomly selects k1 positions of the T
(4)-sequence and tells the selected positions to all the agents.
Then, all the agents choose Green to collect the others’ messages of operations on k1 positions and to per-
form the reverse compound operations. Next, Green performs Bell-basis measurements on two correspond-
ing photons in k1 positions of both the T
(4)-sequence and the H(1)-sequence, and tells his measurement
outcomes to Alice. In result, Alice can judge whether the eavesdropping exists or not. If no eavesdropping
exists, Alice will announce all of the initial Bell states. So all the agents can collaborate to recover Alice’s
secret M.
We can see that, in the DB protocol, the local unitary operation performed by each agent is chosen from
the phase shift operation set S = {U(0), U(2pi/3), U(4pi/3)}. Since the three operations cannot be exactly
distinguished by measuring the different quantum states, Du and Bao stated that their QSS protocol was
secure. However, this is not a fact. In what follows, we will prove that the above five-party case is not
secure by designing a attack strategy on it. Our attack strategy, which is implemented by the two dishonest
agents, Bob and Zach, is described as follows.
In advance, Bob and Zach prepare some Bell states, where each is |ψ+〉t′h′ = 1√2(|01〉t′h′ + |10〉t′h′).
According to the forming-sequence manner in the above step (1), they also get the two sequences, T′-
4sequence and H′-sequence. Here, the T′-sequence is in Bob’s hand and the H′-sequence is in Zach’s hand.
In the above step (2), after Bob receives the T-sequence from Alice, he doesn’t perform any operations on
it, but secretly sends it to Zach. In addition, he performs the local unitary operation U(αi) on photon t
′
i of
the T′-sequence, and sends the T′(1)-sequence, which is transformed from the T′-sequence, to Charlie. At
this moment, the T(1)-sequence has been replaced with the T′(1)-sequence, which is not known by Charlie,
Green and Alice. After receiving the T′(1)-sequence, Charlie performs the local unitary operation U(αi) on
it as of old, and sends the T′(2)-sequence, which is transformed from the T′(1)-sequence, to Green. After
Green receives the T′(2)-sequence, what he needs to do is the same as what Charlie does. This means that
Zach will receive the T′(3)-sequence, which is transformed from the T′(2)-sequence, from Green. After
receiving the sequence, he also performs the local unitary operation U(αi) on it. Now, Zach holds the three
sequences: the T′(4)-sequence (transformed from the T′(3)-sequence), the H′-sequence and the T-sequence.
As soon as Alice sends the H(1)-sequence to him, he will hold all the sequences. When Alice announces k1
positions of the T(4)-sequence, Zach immediately performs Bell-basis measurements on two corresponding
photons in k1 positions of both the T-sequence and the H
′-sequence. Obviously, there exists a process
of swapping entanglement. Let us give an example to show this process. Suppose that Alice’s unitary
operation on photon h
k
j
1
(the subscript kj1 denotes the jth in k1 positions) and her initial Bell state are σ01
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, respectively, and Bob’s, Charlie’s, Green’s and Zach’s local unitary operations on photon
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According to equation (1), we see that Zach’s Bell-basis measurement outcome is one of |φ+〉t
k
j
1
h′
k
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1
,
|φ−〉t
k
j
1
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j
1
, |ψ+〉t
k
j
1
h′
k
j
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and |ψ−〉t
k
j
1
h′
k
j
1
. After the process of swapping entanglement is over, Zach makes
a comparison for his Bell-basis measurement outcome and |ψ−〉t′h′ and obtains a unitary operation. This
kind of Bell state comparison method and its comparison steps can be consulted in the papers [5,6]. Then,
Zach performs the obtained unitary operation on photon h
k
j
1
. At the same time, he performs Bell-basis
measurements on two corresponding photons in k − k1 positions of both the T-sequence and the H(1)-
sequence. Since Green is chosen to collect messages, to perform the reverse compound operations and to
perform Bell-basis measurements in the above step (5), this indirectly means that Zach needs to send two
sequences to him. Notice that, in order not to be detected, the two sequences sent by Zach should be the
5T′(4)-sequence and the H(1)-sequence. Here, we can’t help asking why Bob’s and Zach’s replacing action is
not detected. In the following, we will give the reason by continuing to use the above example. Suppose that
Zach’s Bell-basis measurement outcome is |ψ−〉t
k
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1
h′
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1
, and he compares |ψ−〉t
k
j
1
h′
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1
with |ψ+〉t′h′ to obtain
σ10. According to equation (1), photons t
′
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1
and h
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j
1
are in U(2pi/3)|φ+〉t′
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1
. When σ10 is performed on
photon h
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1
, the system evolves as follows:
σ10U(2pi/3)|φ+〉t′
k
j
1
h
k
j
1
= U(2pi/3)|φ−〉t′
k
j
1
h
k
j
1
(2)
Now, let us see which state photons t
k
j
1
and h
k
j
1
are in if Bob and Zach don’t perform the replacing action.
When Bob’s U(2pi/3), Charlie’s U(0), Green’s U(2pi/3) and Zach’s U(4pi/3) are performed on photon t
k
j
1
and Alice’s σ01 are performed on photon hkj
1
, the system evolves as follows:
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That is, photons t
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1
and h
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are in U(2pi/3)|φ−〉t
k
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h
k
j
1
. Obviously, the state of photons t
k
j
1
and h
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is the
same as that of photons t′
k
j
1
and h
k
j
1
. Therefore, Bob’s and Zach’s replacing action cannot be detected, so
that Alice thinks that the whole quantum channel is secure. Next, she announces all of the initial Bell states.
As soon as Zach knows Alice’s initial Bell states, plus the states that two corresponding photons in k − k1
positions of both the T-sequence and the H(1)-sequence are in, he easily infers Alice’s unitary operation,
that is, her secret M.
In order to resist the above attack that Bob and Zach implement, we will give an improvement of the DB
protocol. Here, this improvement begins with the fourth step because steps (1′), (2′) and (3′) in it are same
as the former three steps in the DB protocol. (4′) Alice randomly selects some photons from the H-sequence
and randomly uses the basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉 = |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |−〉 = |0〉−|1〉√
2
} to measure each selected photon.
Then, Alice announces the positions of the selected photons in the H-sequence, and asks Zach to send the
partner photons of the selected photons in the T(4)-sequence to her and all the agents to publish their local
unitary operations in a random order. Next, Alice performs the reverse compound operations on the partner
photons, and then measures the partner photons with the same basis that are used when measuring the
selected photons in the H-sequence. According to her measurement outcomes, Alice can judge whether the
eavesdropping exists or not. If no eavesdropping exists, Alice performs the four Pauli operations on photons
of the H-sequence to encode her secret M and sends the H(1)-sequence (transformed from the H-sequence)
to Zach. (5′) This step is the same as step (5) in the DB protocol.
We see that another process to check the security is added in the improvement. This process is
mainly used to prevent two dishonest agents from eavesdropping, which had been shown in Wang et al.’s
improving QSS protocol [34]. Of course, in the DB protocol, the attack from a dishonest agent is also
6discussed (please see Section 4.2.2 in the paper [52]), but Du and Bao only analyze a special inside attack
implemented by one dishonest agent, which is called a single attack customarily. For the joint attack that is
implemented by two dishonest agents, they don’t discuss while analyzing the security. As we all know, the
joint attack has stronger attack power than the single attack because more messages may be utilized while
cheating, which is also the reason that the DB protocol is insecure.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, we successfully show that, in the five-party case of the DB protocol, Bob and Zach
can collude to obtain Alice’s secret M without the help of the other agents, moreover, Bob’s and Zach’s
eavesdropping action doesn’t introduce any error. In other words, by designing a joint attack, the DB
protocol is successfully proved to be insecure by us. In addition, in order to resist the joint attack, we make
a modification for the DB protocol, that is, we give an improvement of the DB protocol. To the end, it
is worth emphasizing that the above attack strategy is proposed by combining Bell state comparison and
entanglement swapping, which is similar to that in the paper [42,46]. In addition, another attack strategy to
combine Bell state comparison and quantum teleportation can also be seen in the papers [38,40]. So we
hope that the application of Bell state comparison can be noticed in the future research on QSS.
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